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Hoeflich and Deutsch: Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge

JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND
THE DISINTERESTED JUDGE
M. H. Hoeflich* and Jan G. Deutsch**
INTRODUCTION

For an individual playing a social role to behave responsibly
requires participation in a process that is perceived by society as
having symbolic as well as operational significance. What our society calls law is the result of a process of judicial decisionmaking
resolving individual controversies. The best of the opinions in
which such decisions are embodied attain a precedential value
transcending the facts of the specific disputes they resolve. Public
acceptance of the legal profession, however, rests precisely on the
ability of the professional to blur this possible distinction between
the operational and symbolic function of a judicial opinion: to explicate, for the lay public, the mysteries of precedent as though what
was involved was a rigorously logical set of propositions derived
from a limited set of socially approved presuppositions. Thus, fundamental to this acceptance is the public's belief that when the
lawyer argues the law, he is focusing on something other than his
client's purposes. How such a belief is maintained in connection
with a system in which lawyers perceive their duty as that of manipulating the law so as to maximize the client's satisfaction is the
subject of this essay.
The symbols of our law are heavily weighted towards the concepts of blindness, impartiality, and disinterestedness. Built into
our whole legal structure is the appearance of detachment. Seated
behind bench and bar, the judge is set physically apart from the
other actors in the drama being enacted in the courtroom. In personal terms, moreover, the judge's detachment is symbolized not
only in terms of physical separation, but also in terms of the denial
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of individual characteristics. In the United States, it is the judge
and the judge alone who is swathed in dark, shapeless robes and
addressed by an honorific rather than by name.
In his 1972 Holmes Lectures, published as Persons and Masks
of the Law,' Professor John Noonan decries the use of masks in the
legal process. It is his argument, presented as a study of such a
fonnidable judicial persona as Oliver Wendell Holmes, that the
failure of the legal system is exemplified by the fact that, obsessed
with the appearance of impartiality, its judgments produce both
injustice and inequity. 2 Professor Noonan traces the roots of this
phenomenon to the legal system's refusal to see individuals as individuals, treating them instead as fungible entities- 3 a concept familiar to every law student who has pondered the questions whether
A's words to B constituted a binding contract, or whether X's behavior towards Y should be classified as a tort or a crime. Both a
lawyer and a church historian, Professor Noonan concludes that a
just and equitable jurisprudence can be founded only on the basis
4
of respect for individuality and personality.
It is our contention that the role of the disinterested judge,
blind and to that extent impartial with respect to differences that
distinguish persons from each other, is a crucial component of our
societal stock of myths, and that it is social acceptance of this notion of blind judging that legitimates and therefore maintains the
judicial process. That process, in other words, is, in societal terms,
no more nor less than a morality play, the thematic unity of which
consists in the disinterestedness of the author of the play. What
this argument is based on is that the instrument of judicial power is
the opinion deciding the case before the court. It is that opinion,
and not the individual personality of its author, that must be perceived as successful in having imposed justice upon the controversy
being adjudicated.
Yosal Rogat, in his study of Justice Holmes, The Judge as
Spectator,5 comments: "Uninvolved with the life of his society,
Holmes affected it profoundly. The apotheosis of Holmes defeats
understanding. .

.

. [I]t is possible to take another view of the

praise intended by Holmes' most distinguished follower: '[The sig1.

J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976).

2.
3.
4.
5.

See id. at 6-28.
See id. at 150-51.
See id. at 152-67.
31 U. CiI. L. REv. 213 (1964).
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nificance of his genius would evaporate in any analysis of specific

decisions.'

"6

The opinions in which those decisions are contained may be
viewed from another perspective than Rogat's, a perspective suggested by the paradigmatic story of Solomon's judgment. 7 It is not
the wisdom of the judgment, nor the equity of the result, that is
central to the paradigm; it is, rather, the judgment itself. Solomon
the judge orders that an infant, an innocent guilty of no transgression, be cut in half. In our view, the wisdom of Solomon, the
knowledge that the true mother will not allow her child to be torn
asunder, is less significant than the fact that only a man totally
detached from the controversy being adjudicated could order that
decree into execution. It is not the man Solomon who decrees the
child's death; it is the judicial actor in the morality play. It is the
disinterestedness which legitimates the judicial role.
In cultural terms, moreover, what is crucial to the knowledge
on which the Solomonic judgment is based is that the Israelites
were so small and cohesive a tribe that Solomon could act with
relative assurance concerning the accuracy of predictions about the
behavioral responses of the participants in the controversy before
him. That assurance is necessarily denied to those who attempt to
exercise authority over larger and more diverse groups. Professor
Walter Ullman has written that the essence of theological kingship
is the selection and elevation of the monarch by God, and that the
legitimacy of royal authority arises from its divine origins. 8 And
Paul Tillich is known for having clearly articulated for the lay audience the fundamental nature of the distinction between the human
and the Divine that can be derived from Christian theology. 9
Justice Holmes abjured his Unitarian background. Yosal Rogat
masterfully delineates, in connection with the life of Justice
Holmes, the individual and social currents that eventuated in a
view of human behavior structured in terms of conscious calculation- 10 a world view characterized by the impersonality deplored
by Professor Noonan.
6. Id. at 256 (footnote omitted).
7. 1 Kings 3:16.
8. See W. ULLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE MmDLE AGES (1961); Ullman, Schranken der Konigsgewalt im Mittelalter, 1971 His-

TORICHES JAHRBUCH 1; cf. Hoeflich, CelasiusI and Roman Law: One FurtherWord,
26 J. THEOLOGICAL STUD. 114 (1975) (divine origin of papal power).
9.

See P. TILLICH, BIBLICAL RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR ULTIMATE REAL-

rry (1955).
10. Rogat, The Judge as Spectator,31 U. CHI. L. REv. 213, 221 (1964).
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The consequences of such a position are made apparent in Justice Holmes's opinion in Bates v. Dresser,1 1 concerning "a bill in equity brought by the receiver of a national bank to charge its former
president and directors with the loss of a great part of its assets
through the thefts of an employee of the bank while they were in
power."' 2 The particular fraud at issue "was a novelty in the way of
swindling a bank so far as the knowledge of any experience had
reached [the town in which the bank was located]."' 3 Despite the
existence of "[a] by-law that had been allowed to become obsolete
or nearly so [which was] invoked as establishing their own standard
of conduct,"' 1 4 Justice Holmes held that the directors "were not
bound by virtue of the office gratuitously assumed by them . . .
until the event showed the possibility . . . that their failure . . .
opened a way to fraud."' 5 The president, however, was treated
differently: "In accepting the presidency," held Justice Holmes, he
"must be taken to have contemplated responsibility for losses to the
bank, whatever they were, if chargeable to his fault. Those that
happened were chargeable to his fault, after he had warnings that
'6
should have led to steps that would have made fraud impossible,'
"[h]owever little the warnings may have pointed to the specific
facts."17
The sense in which this result might be viewed as unjust and
inequitable, as a product of the rigid application of technical legal
categories, is clear from the fact that Justice Holmes, before spelling
out the basis on which the president is being held liable for all the
losses suffered by the bank, holds that "[w]e do not perceive any
ground for applying in this case the limitations of liability ex contractu adverted to in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil
Co." 18s Globe Refining,' 9 a Holmes opinion, was premised on the
theory that:
It is true that as people, when contracting contemplate performance, not breach, they commonly say little or nothing as to
what shall happen in the latter event, and the common rules
have been worked out by common sense, which has established
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

251 U.S. 524 (1920).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 530.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 531.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Globe Ref Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
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what the parties probably would have said if they had spoken
about the matter. But a man never can be absolutely certain of
performing any contract when the time of performance arrives,
and in many cases he obviously is taking the risk of an event
which is wholly or to an appreciable extent beyond his control.
The extent of liability in such cases is likely to be within his
contemplation, and whether it is or not, should be worked out
on terms which it fairly may be presumed he would have assented to if they had been presented to his mind.20
An opinion by Judge Learned Hand adjudicating an analogous
controversy demonstrates, however, that a disinterested judge can
in fact calculate what an individual should be held liable for having
foreseen without focusing either on the office of director or president or on the individuals occupying those offices. Barnes v. Andrews 2 1 involved a bill of equity to hold a director liable for misprision of office on the theory of his "general inattention to his duties
as a director." 22 While Judge Hand concluded that "I cannot acquit
Andrews of misprision in his office," 2 3 he declined to hold the defendant liable, because "I pressed [counsel] to show me a case in
which the courts have held that a director could be charged generally with the collapse of a business in respect of which he had been
24
inattentive, and I am not aware that he has found one."
The argument can be made that precedent is oracular in nature, and that a capable judicial interrogator could interpret any
response by counsel compatibly with the result desired in the case
being decided. Judge Hand disagreed with this solely instrumental
view of the common law process:
For many ages, for thousands of years indeed, mankind lived
along without being able to change at all the traditional codes
which regulated the details of their lives. Custom had the sanction of the gods and being divine, men feared to meddle with it.
In civilized times we have indeed acquired that power and it is
upon it that we must rely if we are to say that we are governed
by our common consent. In one way or another we set up officials who innovate, and when they do, we call it our common
will at work. This we have made the cornerstone of our structure. Our common law is the stock instance of a combination of
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 543.
298 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 15
754

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 6: 749

custom and its successive adaptations. The judges receiye it and
profess to treat it as authoritative, while they gently mould it the
better to fit changed ideas. Indeed, the whole of it has been
fabricated in this way like a coral reef, of the symmetry of whose
eventual structure the artificers have no intimation as they
25
labor.
And it is well to remember, in assessing the exercise of judicial authority, that our attitude towards Oedipus changes, and that
his status leads us to feel that his words represent solely a search
for the just and the equitable, precisely when he. is blind at Colonus.
25.

Hand, Is There a Common Will, 28 MIcH. L. REv. 46, 49-50 (1929).
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